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This paper will provide a game-theoretic analysis of the ongoing North Korean missile crisis. It 
begins by discerning from the available literature the options available to each party involved in 
the game and determining a rank ordering (best to worst) for each party of the possible 
combinations of options. I will use the Theory of Moves (ToM) to predict the ultimate outcome 
of the crisis. This requires, in addition, the initial “state of play” when negotiations begin, and the 
first mover in the game, both given by the history of the crisis. ToM allows the parties strictly 
alternating turns to move from the initial state. At each turn to move, a player can either move 
(back to the previous state or ahead to another state), or pass (remain in the current state). 
Equilibrium is achieved when the players choose not to move on consecutive turns, i.e., accept 
the current state as the ultimate outcome. 
The preference orderings of each player are difficult to determine with certainty, so we consider 
a variety of possibilities. A reading of the existing literature on the history of the crisis and the 
expressed interests of the countries involved suggests a set of plausible possibilities worth 
considering in this analysis. I use ToM to sort this set of possibilities into three subsets that each 
yield a different ultimate outcome. Comparisons are drawn between the predictions of the ToM 
and the Nash Equilibrium (NE), a popular game-theoretic approach. Thus, the analysis narrows 
the likely outcomes of the crisis from nine to three and indicates how the preference orderings of 
the two countries influence which of these three outcomes actually occurs.  
Introduction 
 In this paper, the geopolitical conflict between the United States and North Korea will be 
discussed from the perspective of game theory. Game theory was used in the Cold War by 
President John F. Kennedy, who led the U.S. through the nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union 
with the help of game theorists such as Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling (Basu, 2017). 
Game theory uses mathematical models and reasoning to predict the outcome of a “game” 
(strategic conflict) between two rational decision-makers. It allows for logical thinking about 
who is involved in a conflict, what their options are, and what will result from each choice made 
(Winkler, 2017). Kilgour and Hipel (2005, 442) provide a great description for the analysis of a 
strategic conflict, stating that “A strategic conflict is an interaction of two or more independent 
decision-makers, each of whom makes choices that together determine how the state of the 
conflict evolves, and each of whom has preferences over these possible states (as eventual 
resolutions)”. For the analysis in this paper, the United States and North Korea are independent 
decision-makers making policy decisions that will together determine the state of their conflict. 
 This conflict will be examined by implementing ToM, which is an application of game 
theory that simulates two parties negotiating an agreement, perhaps implicitly with moves and 
countermoves. The final state of the game is referred to as the ultimate outcome (UO). This 
application will be compared against the more traditional NE analysis to show the sequence of 
moves toward an agreement between these two countries. The analysis begins once each 
country’s policy decisions are outlined and the possible outcomes (combinations of policies by 
each country) are ranked in order of preference. This paper will examine three potential policy 
options for each country, thus creating nine potential policy combinations, known as “states,” of 
the conflict. 
 Due to incomplete information regarding North Korea’s preferences, this model makes 
credible assumptions based on sources. The leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, is young and 
not much has been revealed about his desires beyond the common knowledge that he wants to 
maintain his family’s dictatorial regime through the development and threat of nuclear weapons 
(Winkler, 2017). In addition to this uncomfortable lack of familiarity with North Korea’s leader, 
the United States is also unaware of the status and location of most nuclear development 
facilities and warheads in North Korea (Sagan, 2017). Even United States preferences cannot be 
entirely pinned down, as President Donald Trump has made incorrect statements regarding North 
Korea in the past, for example claiming that North Korea would never develop a nuclear weapon 
able to reach the United States (Basu, 2017). To account for this incomplete information, 
multiple preference rankings are considered, resulting in eight games being modeled. Each game 
has a slightly different preference ordering, and this slight change can impact both the Nash 
equilibrium and the ultimate outcome from ToM. 
Review of Literature 
 This conflict between the United States and North Korea has been ongoing since the 
1980s. Given this large timespan, there is a lot of literature to be found regarding negotiations, 
policy decisions, and actions taken by either country. To narrow my research and simultaneously 
provide an initial state for my models, I researched primarily scholarly articles and books that 
have been published since President Donald Trump took office for the United States. This 
decision allowed me to also focus specifically on the negotiations between one U.S. leader 
(Trump) and one North Korean leader (Kim Jong Un).  Aside from researching the conflict itself, 
literature detailing game theory and the theory of moves was also necessary for providing 
understanding on the perspective from which this analysis is done.  
 There is an abundance of scholarly articles from the U.S. perspective on this conflict. 
Articles regarding the past, present, and future policy decisions were most useful for this paper, 
as they provided historical evidence of the policies mentioned in my models. Some sources were 
useful in providing timestamps for policy decisions made by either country, while others, such as 
The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option, by Dr. Scott Sagan, 
provided detail on specific U.S. policy options. In this article, Sagan explains how the U.S. has 
enacted economic sanctions and avoided any sort of military action with North Korea for the 
entirety of this conflict and he believes that maintaining this course of action is best for the U.S. 
to avoid war. Sagan further cites Cold War efforts made by President Kennedy and parallels 
those negotiations to current negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. Sagan’s insight on 
the consequences and rationale of United States policy decisions allowed me to establish a 
stronger preference ranking of United States policy alternatives in my models. 
 Although numerous sources are cited throughout this paper, The North Korean Nuclear 
Weapons Crisis the Nuclear Taboo Revisited? by Jina Kim provided perhaps the most substantial 
contribution to this thesis, specifically to my understanding of the North Korean perspective of 
the negotiations within this conflict. In her book, Dr. Kim looks back to the establishment of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and provides deep insight into the nation’s cultural ideals 
and beliefs. She shows how these influenced the development of the country and its negotiation 
habits. Kim displays timetables of all previous major negotiations North Korea has been a part of 
and explains how cultural identity impacted the results of these past negotiations. A significant 
aspect of North Korean ideology that Dr. Kim discusses is Juche. Juche philosophy is a part of 
North Korea’s cultural identity, and it consists of the belief in self-sufficiency, self-respect, and 
self-defense for a nation. Considering this North Korean philosophy helps bring a better 
understanding of decisions the nation has made in the past. The country negotiates with little 
regard for the benefit of other nations. Self-preservation and progression are their primary 
concerns. This philosophy led Dr. Kim to describe North Korean negotiation tactics with the 
phrase “minimal compliance” to best describe many of North Korea’s past decisions. Minimal 
compliance means that North Korea acts in a way that is viewed as compliant to the U.N., U.S., 
and other nations from afar, but in reality, North Korea is still acting solely in their best interest, 
specifically with their nuclear development. Dr. Kim provides evidence of this with North 
Korea’s decisions regarding IAEA inspection and the Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea 
initially appeared to fully accept both the inspections and the treaty, but their later actions 
revealed that they were still developing their nuclear capabilities in secret, not in compliance 
with the NPT or the IAEA. Due to the historical presence of this tactic in North Korean 
negotiations, I include minimal compliance as one of the three policy options for North Korea in 
this paper. 
Policy Options 
 This model looks at three policy options for each country. Upon first glance at the 
conflict, a strong military response is something both countries have hinted at or in the case of 
North Korea, displayed in the form of missile tests (Revere, 2018). In this model, however, 
regardless of how aggressive North Korea or even some Americans appear, strong military 
action is not considered by the U.S. due to the strongly undesirable consequences of an actual 
war. 
United States Policy Options 
 The United States’ three policy alternatives are to normalize relations (NR), place 
economic sanctions (ES), or resort to a limited military action (MA). Normalize relations would 
mean that the United States would develop better communication such as opening an embassy in 
North Korea. Sanctions would be lifted, and international trade would be available for North 
Korea. This policy has never truly been put into place, but President Trump did offer hopes of 
normalized relations with North Korea in June of 2018 (Samuels, 2018). This was offered on the 
grounds that North Korea begin the route to denuclearization, however, which did not occur. 
 The policy option of ES would mean that the United States would continue doing what’s 
been done throughout the majority of this conflict since the 1980s. The U.S. and U.N. have been 
sanctioning North Korea since the beginning of its nuclear development program. Selecting this 
policy option would mean the U.S. is either maintaining or worsening the sanctions applied to 
North Korea (Albert, 2019). These sanctions include any variety of ways that the United States 
can restrict financial services for North Korea, forcing them to produce for themselves or trade 
with a select few countries for necessities, primarily China. An example of the U.S. recently 
enacting this policy option was in August of 2019 when Taiwan and Hong Kong based firms 
were caught attempting to smuggle fuel into North Korea illegally. This resulted in the U.S. 
tightening sanctions on North Korea and applying sanctions to the firms responsible in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong (Talley, 2019). 
 The final option for the United States would be limited to MA. This includes the potential 
for a blockade, shooting down test missiles, or bombing missile launch sites. Boots on the 
ground or nuclear attacks are off the table for this option as they would be acts of war (Sagan, 
2017). This limited MA would be in response to continued and increasingly dangerous missile 
testing and hostility from North Korea. Since the Korean War, the U.S. has not performed many 
military actions towards North Korea. Almost all actions involving the military stemmed from 
sending or removing troops in South Korea and pulling nuclear capabilities out of South Korea 
in a failed effort to denuclearize the peninsula (Kim 2014).  
North Korea Policy Options 
 The policy options for North Korea are to go nuclear (GN), minimal compliance (MC), 
and denuclearization (DN). Going nuclear would mean for North Korea to maintain a fully tested 
nuclear arsenal consisting of missiles and weapons such as IRBMs and ICBMs. This move 
would be with the intent of being accepted as a nation with recognized nuclear capabilities such 
as the U.S., Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. This policy option has been considered by North 
Korea since the beginning of their nuclear development program and North Korea has gone for 
periods with this being their chosen policy, as seen with their increasing number of missile tests 
over the years (Masterson, 2020). 
Minimal compliance means halting nuclear development as far as the outside world is aware of 
and allowing outside observers like the International Atomic Energy Agency to check known 
nuclear sites, which slows the development of nuclear weapon capabilities. “Minimal 
compliance” is a phrase used by Dr. Jina Kim in her book, The North Korean Nuclear Weapons 
Crisis the Nuclear Taboo Revisited. She explains how North Korea has acted rationally and 
consistently throughout this conflict. Even though North Korea has seemed to make irrational 
decisions, such as allowing IAEA inspections and ratifying the Nonproliferation Treaty and 
abruptly withdrawing from each organization, Kim argues that these actions are consistent with 
the strategy of MC. Under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, North Korea 
consistently operated under the policy of minimal compliance, meaning that every decision made 
was intended to prolong the regime by slowly advancing nuclear capabilities while seeming to 
cooperate with the United States and United Nations. This strategy has been used significantly 
less by Kim Jong Un, who took leadership of the country in 2011, but he seemed to apply it in 
2018 when North Korea did not fire any missile tests (Masterson, 2020) under what appeared to 
be good standing with the United States after the 2018 Singapore Summit (Fisher, 2018). 
The third and final policy alternative for North Korea is DN. This means dismantling nuclear 
weapon capabilities, although scientific and research infrastructure would remain, subject to 
international observation, and North Korea would be allowed to develop nuclear capabilities for 
exclusively peaceful purposes. Although the United States along with the rest of the world 
strongly desires this outcome, it is highly unlikely to ever happen. In the past, North Korea has 
offered denuclearization in exchange for U.S. removal of troops and nuclear capabilities from 
South Korea, but this was actually minimal compliance, as the U.S. upheld their end of the deal, 
but North Korea did not (Kim, 2014). 
Priorities and Preferences 
 The United States’ priorities are to reduce the threat of nuclear warfare in the world and 
to issue a warning to any other nations that may attempt to follow in the footsteps of North 
Korea. North Korea’s priorities are to deter the U.S. and other international aggression, maintain 
power for the ruling family and regime by strengthening nuclear capabilities, and to force other 
nations to take them seriously as a world power. These priorities are expressed in the preference 
orderings for the different states of play within the games in this model. We do not know these 
preferences with certainty, so we consider several variations as possibilities. 
For the United States, preference rankings for each state are as follows: 
NR/GN: 4  NR/MC: 7 or 8 NR/DN: 9 
ES/GN: 5 or 6 ES/MC: 7 or 8 ES/DN: 3 
MA/GN: 5 or 6 MA/MC: 2  MA/DN: 1 
For North Korea, preference rankings for each state are as follows: 
NR/GN: 9  NR/MC: 7  NR/DN: 5 
ES/GN: 8  ES/MC: 6  ES/DN: 4 
MA/GN: 2 or 3 MA/MC: 2 or 3 MA/DN: 1 
Rationale for the Preference Rankings of each State 
NR/GN: The United States lifts sanctions and opens international trade for North Korea, North 
Korea establishes itself as a nuclear power in the world. 
 Normalize Relations/Go Nuclear is ranked as a 4 for the U.S. and a 9 for North Korea. 
For the U.S., this ranking is preferred over punishing a denuclearized North Korea with sanctions 
or military action as well as applying military action to a minimally complying North Korea. The 
reasoning behind these rankings is that the U.S. does not by any means want a nuclear North 
Korea, but the U.S. is a rational decision-maker, and punishing North Korea for denuclearizing is 
irrational and illegal. The same can be said for applying military action when North Korea is in 
minimal compliance, it is not prudent and therefore is ranked lower than NR/GN. That being 
said, this is not a desirable state for the U.S., as shown by the rankings for responding to a 
nuclear North Korea with either sanctions or limited military action in the model. As for North 
Korea, this is the dream scenario. North Korea has a strong preference for going nuclear, and to 
go nuclear and normalize relations would be the ultimate achievement for Kim Jong-un(Kim, 
2014). 
ES/GN: The United States tightens financial burdens on North Korea such as restricting trade 
partners and goods available for trade, North Korea establishes itself as a nuclear power in the 
world. 
 Economic Sanctions/Go Nuclear is ranked as a 5 or 6 for the United States and an 8 for 
North Korea. This state of play has occurred before and will likely occur again, as the United 
States has and will continue to tighten economic sanctions in response to continued nuclear 
development by North Korea (Min, 2017). This is consistent in scenarios where the ranking is 6 
because that is the United States’ highest preference in response to North Korea going nuclear in 
the model. The reason for the potential ranking of 5 is in scenarios where North Korea acts with 
nuclear capabilities in an extreme way, such as testing missiles extremely close to the United 
States or another nation and putting people in danger. This would force the U.S.’s hand towards 
limited military action, similar to Kennedy's enacting of a naval blockade of Cuba during the 
Cold War (Basu, 2017). As for North Korea, this state is ranked as an 8 because it is consistent 
with their desire to become a fully nuclear state and a decreasing incentive to stop nuclear 
development (Min, 2017). In this scenario, they are countered with economic sanctions, which 
are undesirable, but not as much as U.S. military action. 
MA/GN: The United States applies limited military force e.g., a blockade, bombing missile 
launch sites, and shooting down missile tests, North Korea establishes itself as a nuclear power 
in the world. 
 Military Action/Go Nuclear is ranked as a 5 or 6 for the United States and a 2 or 3 for 
North Korea. The ranking of 5 or 6 for the United States was explained above when explaining 
the ranking for ES/GN, which has the same possible rankings. For North Korea, this option is 
ranked a 2 or 3 because military action is the least desirable policy it would like to face. North 
Korea does not want United States military involvement in the Korean peninsula at all, as shown 
with their strong desire to remove U.S. troops and nuclear capabilities from South Korea (Kim, 
2014). Beyond this, the ranking of 3 is for scenarios where the United States shoots down test 
missiles, as the 3 would be the most preferred way to combat that military action in this scenario, 
and North Korea has stated it will retaliate against said military action (Min, 2017). The ranking 
of 2 is for scenarios where North Korea feels that it is more in their interest to respond to military 
action with minimal compliance, as they did in the 1990s when trying to achieve the removal of 
U.S. nuclear capabilities and troops from South Korea (Kim, 2014). 
NR/MC: The United States lifts sanctions and opens international trade for North Korea, North 
Korea acts in minimal compliance with U.S. and U.N. requests, pausing nuclear development 
and allowing for outside inspection of known nuclear facilities. 
 Normalize Relations/Minimal Compliance is ranked as a 7 or 8 for the United States and 
a 7 for North Korea. This state is ranked as a 7 or 8 for the United States because it is one of the 
best and most likely outcomes given that North Korea will not denuclearize. The ranking of 7 is 
for scenarios when North Korea’s minimal compliance leans more towards going nuclear and the 
ranking of 8 is for scenarios when the minimal compliance leans more towards genuine 
compliance. If North Korea’s minimal compliance is getting noticeably closer to nuclearization, 
the U.S. would rather apply economic sanctions to slow this movement. For North Korea, this 
state is ranked as a 7 because it is the most favorable option aside from their preference of going 
nuclear. Minimally complying allows for them to continue slowly enhancing nuclear capabilities 
in secret while normalized relations allows for the advancement of their economy. 
ES/MC: The United States tightens financial constraints on North Korea such as restricting trade 
partners and goods available for trade, North Korea acts in minimal compliance with U.S. and 
U.N. requests, pausing nuclear development and allowing for outside inspection of known 
nuclear facilities. 
 Economic Sanctions/Minimal Compliance is ranked as a 7 or 8 for the United States and 
a 6 for North Korea. The ranking of 7 or 8 for the United States was explained above, under 
NR/MC. As for North Korea, this state is ranked a 6 because NR/GN, ES/GN, and NR/MC are 
all more beneficial to North Korea’s agenda of going nuclear and advancing as a nation of 
power, but all other states either include military action or denuclearization, both of which North 
Korea aims to avoid. 
MA/MC: The United States applies limited military force e.g., a blockade, bombing missile 
launch sites, and shooting down missile tests, North Korea acts in minimal compliance with U.S. 
and U.N. requests, pausing nuclear development and allowing for outside inspection of known 
nuclear facilities. 
 Military Action/Minimal Compliance is ranked as a 2 for the United States and a 2 or 3 
for North Korea. This state is ranked a 2 for the U.S. because there is little to no incentive to 
apply military action to a minimally complying North Korea and the only worse state of play is 
to apply military action to a denuclearized North Korea. Historically, the United States has 
valued sanctions over military action when both options were available. This is partially how 
Truman avoided disaster when faced against a newly nuclear Russia and China in the 1960s. 
(Sagan, 2017). For North Korea, this state is ranked a 2 or 3 because of previously mentioned 
reasons listed under MA/GN. 
NR/DN: The United States lifts sanctions and opens international trade for North Korea, North 
Korea dismantles all nuclear weapons capabilities, leaving only peaceful nuclear capabilities. 
 Normalize Relations/Denuclearize is ranked as a 9 for the United States and a 5 for North 
Korea. This is the ideal state for the United States. The United States would gladly welcome 
North Korea to the world stage if they denuclearized. For North Korea, this state is ranked as a 5 
because it avoids U.S. military action and is the best outcome provided they denuclearize, but it 
is not preferred compared to minimal compliance and going nuclear. 
ES/DN: The United States tightens financial constraints on North Korea such as restricting trade 
partners and goods available for trade, North Korea dismantles all nuclear weapons capabilities, 
leaving only peaceful nuclear capabilities. 
 Economic Sanctions/Denuclearize is ranked as a 3 for the United States and a 4 for North 
Korea. This is ranked as a 3 for the United States because they would not apply economic 
sanctions to a denuclearized North Korea. This state is ranked a 3 because ranks 2 and 1 for the 
U.S. are less realistic. For North Korea, this state is ranked a 4 because they have no incentive to 
denuclearize, but rankings 1, 2, and 3 are placed on less ideal states that involve either 
denuclearization, U.S. military action, or both. 
MA/DN: The United States applies limited military force such as a blockade, North Korea 
dismantles all nuclear weapons capabilities, leaving only peaceful nuclear capabilities. 
 Military Action/Denuclearize is ranked as a 1 for the United States and a 1 for North 
Korea. This state of play is simply unthinkable for both sides and would never happen. The 
United States would not enact military action on a denuclearized North Korea and North Korea 
would not denuclearize to combat military action. 
Nash Equilibrium vs Theory of Moves and Ultimate Outcome 
 Eight scenarios are examined in this model. These eight scenarios resulted in two 
different Nash Equilibria and three different ultimate outcomes. To discover the Nash 
Equilibrium of a game, we do a best-response analysis of each payoff configuration for each 
country. For example, in Game 1, the United States’ best policy choice to combat North Korea 
choosing to go nuclear is economic sanctions. This is because the U.S. prefers economic 
sanctions (preference rank 6) over normalized relations (preference rank 4) and military action 
(preference rank 5) in response to North Korea going nuclear. After selecting each country’s best 
response to the other country’s policy decisions, the Nash Equilibrium reveals itself as any state 
that is the best policy alternative for each country, given the policy decision of the other. Again, 
looking at Game 1, the Nash Equilibrium is the state ES/GN. This is because economic sanctions 
are the U.S. preference to combat North Korea going nuclear and going nuclear is the North 
Korean preference to combat U.S. sanctions. 
 In contrast, the ToM provides a sequential-move analysis, displaying a chain of decisions 
that reaches an ultimate outcome rather than simultaneous decisions. Sequential-move analysis is 
appropriate for this conflict, as this is not an issue that will be resolved with each country simply 
making one decision (Basu, 2017). To apply ToM, we first begin with an initial state of play. We 
will begin in 2018, where the state of this conflict was economic sanctions by the U.S. and 
minimal compliance by North Korea. This is consistent with the U.S. and North Korean actions 
at the time, as the U.S. had been continuing its policy of economic sanctions and North Korea 
had halted nuclear tests in 2018. In June 2018, at the Singapore Summit, President Trump made 
the first move by offering to change U.S. policy from economic sanctions to normalize relations, 
providing that North Korea would take the next step by choosing to denuclearize. This proposal 
was brought up during the Singapore Summit that year (Fisher, 2018). 
 Following this initial state of play, the game has strictly alternating turns to move, so 
North Korea has the next turn to either move (change its policy to denuclearize or go nuclear) or 
pass (maintain its minimal compliance policy). If it chooses to denuclearize, the U.S. reaches its 
most preferred state. If it passes or chooses to go nuclear, the U.S. can switch back to economic 
sanctions or pass on the next turn to move. Play continues with the players alternating turns to 
move.  The game ends at its ultimate outcome after (1) consecutive passes (the players both 
agree to remain at the current state), or (2) a maximum number of moves (not counting passes) 
have been made by the players (Willson, 1998). The ultimate outcome for this game does not 
depend on the maximum number of moves, but a finite number of moves is necessary to solve 
the game by backward induction. 
 The players receive the payoffs associated with the ultimate outcome. Analysis of the 
ultimate outcome is done by reviewing the route taken to achieve the said outcome, referred to as 
the equilibrium path. Another reason ToM is a better tool for analyzing this conflict is that the 
strategy required for either side of this conflict is not immediately visible, but upon viewing the 
equilibrium path and seeing the necessary responses either country needs to make to achieve 
their most mutually beneficial outcome, it becomes more clear (Carpanini, 2017). 
The next section presents all eight scenarios, grouped by their similarities concerning Nash 









Table 1: Games That Share a Nash Equilibrium and an Ultimate Outcome 
 
 In the four scenario payoff configurations in Table 1, the Nash Equilibrium and the 
ultimate outcome are the same, Economic Sanctions/Go/Nuclear. The difference between each of 
these games is the shifting of the U.S. 7 and 8 preference rankings between NR/MC and ES/MC 
alongside the shifting of North Korea’s 2 and 3 preference rankings between MA/GN and 
MA/MC. The preference orderings for the United States in these games prioritizes sanctions in 
response to a nuclear North Korea and normalized relations in response to denuclearization. The 
games are split, however, in their response to minimal compliance. Games 1 and 3 value 
normalized relations over economic sanctions to combat minimal compliance, implying that in 
these scenarios the U.S. believes normalizing relations can either bring North Korea from 
minimal compliance to denuclearization or at least prevent the transition to going nuclear. For 
Games 2 and 4, the opposite can be said. These scenarios display interactions where the U.S. 
feels economic sanctions are a better policy response to prevent nuclearization or persuade 
denuclearization. The significance of a shared Nash Equilibrium and ToM ultimate outcome is 
that regardless of simultaneous moves or sequential moves, the result is the same. In a single-
turn game with both countries acting simultaneously, they will each find ES/GN to be their best 
policy decision. In a sequential-move game with each country alternating turns from the initial 
state, the countries will eventually move to and agree on the ES/GN state as well. 
 North Korea’s preference ordering in these games primarily signifies a strong desire to 
both pursue going nuclear and avoid U.S. military action. The difference between Games 1 and 2 
compared to Games 3 and 4 concerning North Korea is the preference to go nuclear or show 
minimal compliance in response to U.S. military action. Games 1 and 2 present situations where 
North Korea feels full nuclear capabilities are the necessary response to actions such as a 
blockade or shooting down test missiles by the U.S. Games 3 and 4, however, show scenarios 
where North Korea feels that minimal compliance is the better response to such limited military 
action, due to either a lacking nuclear program or a struggling economy. Regardless, the Nash 
Equilibrium and ultimate outcome among these four games show that these specific preference 
changes do not change the result of the game. This is not true for all games however, as we will 





Table 2: Games with Ultimate Outcomes That Differ from Nash Equilibria 
 
 In these two games, the Nash Equilibrium is Military Action/Go Nuclear, however, the 
ultimate outcome is Normalize Relations/Minimal Compliance. This split comes from swapping 
the U.S. preference rankings of 5 and 6 so that MA/GN is ranked higher than ES/GN. This small 
change moves the Nash Equilibrium from ES/GN to MA/GN and the ultimate outcome from 
ES/GN to either NR/MC or ES/MC. This Nash Equilibrium shift follows the U.S. preference 
ranking 6. The ultimate outcome shift, however, follows the U.S. preference ranking of 8 and is 
Pareto superior to the Nash Equilibrium in these games. This provides evidence that the Theory 
of Moves will discover a Pareto superior outcome if one is available (Willson, 1998). Such an 
outcome means that neither country cannot improve its state without reducing the other country’s 
state.  
 Performing a sequential turn analysis (ToM) rather than a simultaneous turn analysis 
(Nash) allows for this Pareto superior ultimate outcome to emerge. This is due to the reactionary 
element of ToM. ToM provides each country with the knowledge of the current state as well as 
the routes available to reach other states. Each country then makes sequential decisions in an 
effort to reach their desired state, and these decisions will eventually lead to a Pareto superior 
outcome when one is present. A ToM analysis of Table 2 shows that, based on these preference 
rankings, if the United States prioritizes military action as their response to a nuclear North 
Korea then North Korea will avoid going nuclear in the ultimate outcome. The Nash equilibrium 
analysis of Table 2, however, shows that when forced to act simultaneously, The U.S. will 
engage in limited military action to combat North Korea going nuclear.  
Table 3: Games with no Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies 
 
 In these two games, the ultimate outcomes are Normalize Relations/Minimal Compliance 
and Economic Sanctions/Minimal Compliance. These ultimate outcomes follow the U.S. 
preference ranking 8. What makes these games interesting is there is no Nash Equilibrium in 
pure strategies for either game. This is the result of switching the North Korean preference 
rankings 2 and 3 from MA/GN to MA/MC. This switch implies that in this scenario, North 
Korea would rather respond to U.S. limited military action with minimal compliance than going 
nuclear. This would be a situation where the U.S. limited military action, whether it be shooting 
down test missiles, bombing missile launch sites, or putting in place a naval blockade, would put 
North Korea at too much of a deficit in terms of finances or resources or both. Thus, minimal 
compliance would be more beneficial than going nuclear. 
 These games present further support towards a Theory of Moves analysis rather than 
Nash Equilibrium analysis, showing that an ultimate outcome through ToM can still be found 
when the Nash Equilibrium does not exist. To provide a visual for this application of the ToM 
below is a game tree illustrating the different moves for each country in Game 7. The 
equilibrium path is marked with bold arrows and the ultimate outcome can be seen at the end of 
this path, in terminal nodes containing a star in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. The template for this game 
tree is from Ukraine Crisis 2014: A Study of Russian-Western Strategic Interaction (Ericson & 
Zeager, 2015). 
Theory of Moves Tree for Game Seven 
 Following along the equilibrium path, the game starts in state 5, ES/MC, and the U.S. 
makes the first move by changing its policy to normalize relations, leaving North Korea in state 
2, NR/MC. With the second move, North Korea has the choice to change their policy from 
minimal compliance to go nuclear or denuclearize. Following the equilibrium path, North Korea 
chooses to pass, leaving the U.S. in a position to change policies again in response to North 
Korea’s minimal compliance. From here, the equilibrium path branches two directions, 
depending on if the U.S. chooses to again pass, which ends the game with the two countries 
either agreeing to accept this state as the ultimate outcome or to change policy back to economic 
sanctions. If the U.S. does choose to apply economic sanctions, this again puts North Korea back 
in position to change policies. Following Figure 1.2, in response to U.S. economic sanctions, 
North Korea will pass, staying at state 5, ES/MC. The U.S. will then respond to this continued 
minimal compliance with limited military action, putting the game in state 8, MA/MC. North 
Korea again chooses to pass in this state, to which the U.S. responds with falling back to 





 This paper has presented an analysis of the North Korean Missile Crisis through the lens 
of game theory and in particular, the theory of moves. Upon applying preference rank orderings 
to all available policy options for the United States and North Korea in this conflict, priorities are 
clear. The United States aims to push North Korea to denuclearize while avoiding the use of 
military force (however limited) if possible, and North Korea desires to become a fully nuclear 
state while also avoiding triggering U.S. military action. Aside from these priorities, the United 
States and North Korea both have moderate to high preference for three particular states, ES/GN, 
NR/MC, and ES/MC. The high preference rankings that both countries place on these states lead 
to all eight scenarios producing ultimate outcomes in these three states. Incomplete information 
prevents a firmer grasp on the ultimate outcome of this conflict, and slight adjustments to the 
combination of preference orderings, as seen in the eight models simulated, can significantly 
alter the result, and especially alter the Nash Equilibrium, which in comparison is not as 
insightful as the ToM ultimate outcome for this analysis.  
 The first of the ultimate outcomes derived from these games is Economic Sanctions/Go 
Nuclear, as seen in Games 1-4. This outcome is consistent with much of what has occurred since 
Kim Jong Un took leadership of North Korea in 2011, as North Korea has drastically increased 
its missile testing and the U.S. has responded with tighter sanctions. The second ultimate 
outcome is Normalize Relations/Minimal Compliance, found in Games 5 and 7. This has not yet 
occurred for an extended period, although the state was proposed by Donald Trump at the 
Singapore Summit in 2018, under the understanding that North Korea would make efforts to 
denuclearize, which did not occur. (Fisher, 2018). The third and final ultimate outcome derived 
from these games is Economic Sanctions/Minimal Compliance, found in Games 6 and 8. This 
state was relatively consistent before the reign of Kim Jong Un, as the United States alongside 
the United Nations has sanctioned North Korea since the beginning of its nuclear program. North 
Korea has responded to these sanctions with minimal compliance throughout this conflict, 
allowing for partial inspections of nuclear facilities and temporarily halting nuclear testing and 
development for periods. This minimal compliance was a calculated decision with North Korea 
aiming to remove U.S. forces and nuclear capabilities from South Korea while slowly continuing 
nuclear development unknown to the rest of the world (Kim, 2014). Among these three ultimate 
outcomes, two have occurred multiple times throughout history and one has been considered a 
few times. Regardless of which scenario most accurately captures the actual preference rankings 
of the two nations, application of the theory of moves to this crisis reveals conditions under 
which the most plausible outcomes could come to pass.  
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